Gruppe Messel, Pamphlet
A Perspective on Relational Animal Ethics: On the Intertwining of Speciesism and Biologism (Revised Edition)
1. The Problem
– Speciesism is widely criticized in animal ethics.
– Nevertheless, discourse continues to rely on biological classifications of animals.
– Animals are primarily understood as organisms, species, or sentient systems.
The paradox: Critiques of domination are often articulated within the very conceptual framework that already objectifies animals.
2. The Concept: Critique of Biologism
– Biology is not merely a neutral science.
– Historically, it has primarily described animals as objects, not as existing Others.
– This perspective renders animals as objects of knowledge and administration.
The problem, therefore, lies not solely in the hierarchy of species, but in the reduction of animal existence to biological determinability.
Even critical approaches often remain within a framework that defines what animals can be in the first place—for example, when sentience or cognition serve as narrowly defined prerequisites for ethical consideration.
3. Consequences for Animal Ethics
Typical arguments in animal ethics rely on concepts such as:
– Sentience
– Cognition
– Nervous system
This means that animals are defined primarily by their biological characteristics. Their existence is situated within a classificatory framework that not only describes but also predetermines what is recognizable as an “animal” in the first place. A historically formative influence here is René Descartes’ reduction of animals to “bodies” in the sense of the mind-body dichotomy. Consequently, their classification as objects of research, management, and evaluation became entrenched.
4. An Alternative Approach
Instead of defining animals primarily biologically, other approaches can be considered:
– Animals as coexisting subjects (relationality, ethics of a withworld, Mitweltethik)
– Animals as irreducible presences
– Animals beyond species categories and functionalist determinations
This does not reject biological knowledge entirely, but it refuses to let biology define the ontological status of animals, since breaking it down into properties, functions, or components already implies control over animal existence.
Even where ethics appeals to sentience or cognition, it often remains bound to a classificatory logic that forms animals as objects before ethical thought even begins.
Relational experiences show, however, that this framework can be transcended—such as when humans encounter animals directly and perceive them not as specimens, but as counterparts: as bearers of their own perspectives, not as bundles of properties.
5. A Brief Conclusion
– Critique of speciesism must extend to a critique of biologism.
– Animals cannot be reduced to biological objects or populations.
– Ethical coexistence requires acknowledging their autonomy beyond objectifying frameworks.
To truly challenge speciesism, we must be able to critique biologism as a central factor in definitional reduction and ethical constriction.
Ethical coexistence, in its full complexity, requires understanding animals not as “biological objects,” but as relational beings with their own existence and an agency that must be evaluated independently—a perspective that enables a real and justifiable shift in human-animal relations.
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17.03.26